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AbSTRACT 
As stated by the New Institutional Economics theory, transaction costs play a relevant role in economics and, according to 
the extent of such costs, agents make investment decisions. Actually, transaction costs may represent a disincentive to entre-
preneurship. This work aims to verify whether transaction costs are related to investment rate and foreign direct investment 
rate (FDI) in different business environments. The results suggest that foreign investors do not have precise information 
about other countries as  domestic investors do; as it is observed, only the relation between transaction costs and investment 
rate is significant. Furthermore, there is evidence that the business environments of BRIC countries are less developed when 
compared to business environments of other countries in the study.
keywords Transaction costs, foreign direct investment, investment rate, BRICs, business environment.
RESUMO De acordo com a teoria desenvolvida pela Nova Economia Institucional, os custos de transação têm um papel relevante na economia e 
de acordo com a extensão desses custos os agentes tomam decisões de investimento. Dessa forma, os custos de transação também representam um 
desestímulo ao empreendedorismo. Este trabalho tem como objetivo verificar se os custos de transação têm relação com variáveis como a taxa de 
investimento e o investimento direto estrangeiro (IDE). Os resultados encontrados sugerem que os investidores estrangeiros não possuem informações 
acuradas sobre os outros países, ao contrário do que ocorre com os investidores nacionais. Dessa forma, os custos de transação só são significativos 
quando a variável dependente analisada é a taxa de investimento. Além disso, há evidência de que os ambientes de negócios observados nos países 
do grupo BRIC estão menos desenvolvidos em comparação com outros países presentes no estudo.  
PALAVRAS-ChAVE Custos de transação, investimento direto estrangeiro, taxa de investimento, BRICs, ambiente de negócios.
RESUMEN Como se ha señalado por la teoría de la Nueva Economía Institucional, los costos de transacción desempeñan un papel relevante en la 
economía y de acuerdo con la extensión de estos costos los agentes toman decisiones de inversión. Así pues, los costos de transacción también repre-
sentan un desincentivo a la iniciativa empresarial. Este estudio pretende verificar si los costos de transacción tienen relación con variables como la 
tasa de inversión y la tasa de inversión extranjera directa (IED). Los resultados sugieren que los inversores extranjeros no tienen información precisa 
acerca de otros países, a diferencia de lo que sucede con los inversores nacionales. Por lo tanto, los costos de transacción son sólo significativos cuando 
la variable dependiente que se analiza es la tasa de inversión. Además, existe evidencia de que los entornos empresariales observados en los países 
BRIC están menos desarrollados en comparación con los entornos empresariales de otros países presentes en el estudio.
PALAbRAS CLAVE Costos de transacción, inversión extranjera directa, tasa de inversión, BRICs, entorno empresarial.176  •  ©RAE  •  São Paulo  •  v. 51  •  n. 2  •  mar./abr. 2011  •  175-187 ISSN 0034-7590
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INTRODUCTION
New Institutional Economics, unlike neoclassical eco-
nomic theory, emphasizes the role of transaction costs 
in the economy. According to this school of thought, 
transaction costs exist and are taken into account when 
taking a decision about making an investment or starting 
a business. Thus, the market cannot operate efficiently.  
According to Arrow (1969), transaction costs are the 
costs of the economy’s operating system. More recently 
they have been given a wider interpretation that includes 
some costs that exhibit international traits. Thus, 
Furubotn and Richter (1997) define transaction costs 
as being those that result from the creation, operation, 
maintenance and modification of institutions. 
Investment rates and foreign direct investment are es-
sential to a sector’s productive growth in an economy and 
also contribute, in the case of foreign direct investment, 
to the equilibrium of the balance of payments. Therefore, 
attracting investment is considered to be beneficial for a 
country. Nevertheless, decisions on the investment rate 
and foreign direct investment do not only take into ac-
count the economy’s interest rate. There are many factors 
that make an industry attractive to more investment. 
Included among these factors are uncertainty levels when 
it comes to invested property capital and the degree of 
difficulty in doing business. The variables relating to this 
investment risk and business rigidity are called transac-
tion costs by Williamson (1979). The reason for this is 
that the investment risk increases if a country does not 
guarantee property rights. However, monitoring capital 
and seeking information regarding investment guarantees 
leads to costs for the investor. Thus, investment risks and 
an environment favorable to capital attraction are closely 
connected to transaction costs, either directly or indirectly. 
These types of transaction costs create disincentives to 
new business and may, for example, negatively influence 
a local entrepreneur’s decision to form a partnership with 
a foreign entrepreneur or a multinational’s decision to go 
into business in another country. 
The purpose of this study is to verify the behavior 
of the investment rate and foreign direct investment 
through transaction cost variables, measured using market 
imperfections and economic freedom indices, and also 
to provide a comparative analysis of the various business 
environments in different countries.   
This study’s contribution, therefore, is the analysis of 
the impact of transaction costs on non-specific invest-
ments (the economy’s investment rate and foreign direct 
investment), unlike most of the studies in this area, which 
have tried to verify the negative impact of transaction costs 
on specific sectors or industries. Furthermore, its variables 
have been recently created by Doing Business and by the 
Heritage Foundation as a means of measuring transaction 
costs. These variables will therefore be used in this work 
as measures of transaction cost. It uses a sample of 35 
countries (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development members - OECD, Brazil, Russia, India and 
China, and South Africa - BRICS) over a 4-year period 
(2004 – 2007). 
Along with this introduction and the conclusion, this 
study contains five other sections. The first is a literature 
review of transaction costs. The second part is an expla-
nation of the methodology and is followed by the third 
section, which presents a summary of the different busi-
ness environments in the countries contained within the 
sample. Section 4 describes the main results as well as their 
interpretation and section 5 presents the main conclusions. 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND INVESTMENT 
DECISIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Market imperfections, namely transaction costs, have been 
at the center of an important debate in economics that 
began in the latter half of the 20th century.  Among the 
authors who brought the main concepts of transaction 
costs and their disadvantages to light are Coase (1960), 
Arrow (1969), Williamson (1979), North (1984 and 1990) 
and Mankiw (1985)
Transaction costs, according to Coase (1960), are 
mainly made up of information acquisition costs and ne-
gotiation costs. Information costs are evidently representa-
tive and intuitive, and are related, for instance, to seeking 
information about a job candidate in the labor market. 
However, negotiation costs cannot be underestimated as 
they are present at all times in the economy with the result 
that negotiated prices are not always the most efficient. 
Nevertheless, the classical macroeconomic models do 
not take such costs into account but regard the market 
as having no imperfections. According to Furubotn and 
Richter (1997), macroeconomic models should consider 
transaction costs, because not doing so means assuming, 
for instance, that a firm does not seek information relating 
to a market and its agents, and this does not seem logical. 
Transaction costs may thus be classified as follows: the 
cost of drawing up contracts, which is related to the cost 
of research and information; the cost of signing contracts, 
which is related to negotiation and decision-making costs; 
and the cost of monitoring and enforcing contracts. Marcos Vinício Wink Junior • Hsia Hua sHeng • WilliaM eid Junior
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Furubotn and Richter (1997) believe that, most of 
the time, there are great differences between prices of 
similar – sometimes identical – products. Be that as it 
may, consumers prefer not to seek information regarding 
the price of products in other shops. The authors state 
that the difference between the observed price and the 
average price is a measure of the scale of the transaction 
cost. They also consider that the final stage transaction 
costs of the production process are equal to 10% of the 
final price paid by the consumer. Therefore, they argue 
that, when one takes into account all the different links 
in the production chain, transaction costs may represent 
as much as 60% of the final price of the product.
Wallis and North (1988) estimate the transaction costs 
for the American economy in 1970.  Their results indicate 
that transaction costs may have represented as much 
as 55% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at that time. 
In a historical perspective, the authors also analyze the 
percentage of transaction costs in relation to GDP for the 
decades from 1870 until 1970. According to the authors, 
transaction costs’ share of the economy increased by more 
than 200% over the course of this period. 
The impact of transaction costs on investments has 
frequently been the subject of study, and this can be ob-
served in the literature. The main authors in this area are 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and 
Faroque and Ton-That (1995). In general, these authors 
have shown that the presence of transaction costs has a 
negative impact on the investment level in certain specific 
industries in different countries. 
Sara and Newhouse (1995) used Heritage Foundation 
data to study the impact of economic freedom and busi-
ness environment indicators on developing countries’ 
flows of direct foreign investment.  It was found that 
countries with poor international trade, regulation and 
property rights policies tend to have lower inflows of 
foreign investment. According to Benjamin and Phimister 
(1997), the presence of transaction costs prevents the 
credit market from operating in a really efficient way. 
They also argue that the imperfection of this market 
has a negative impact on investments. Countries which 
have a high share of transaction costs in their economy 
therefore tend to have restrictions in their credit markets, 
and consequently have low investment rates and thus low 
economic growth.  
Maher (1997) includes case studies for different indus-
tries and tries to verify the relationship between contracts 
in an environment with transaction costs. In order to do 
this, the following four industries were analyzed: the 
automotive, mechanical engineering, electronic and gas 
industries. The author finds evidence that the best form 
of governance, in terms of reducing transaction costs, 
comes from the market. Hence, the issue of opportunism, 
which is considered one of the main transaction costs, is 
diminished and, as a consequence, it favors the attraction 
of investment to this sector, according to the empirical 
results of the study.  
Dunning (1994) states that during the 1990’s, countries 
and firms underwent structural changes which were aimed 
at making foreign direct investment more attractive. Such 
changes relate to greater equilibrium between domestic 
and foreign accounts, a strong privatization program with 
the purpose of reducing bureaucracy and increasing mar-
ket share in the supply of goods and services and, finally, a 
stimulus towards greater autonomy for the Central Bank.   
The aforementioned changes ended up promoting the 
reduction of transaction costs. According to the author, 
these changes would enable a greater capital flow and the 
financing of the balance of payments of several countries. 
On the other hand, Macaulay (1963, 1985) argues that 
commercial transactions are primarily non-contractual 
and, thus, transaction costs would not have such a relevant 
impact on the economy. Williamson (1985) credits such 
evidence to the fact that transaction costs affect invest-
ments only when they are specific to a particular sector of 
the economy, and, in cases where they are not, the market 
solution will be efficient. This occurs due to the high risk 
of obtaining information in an unknown market, the high 
costs of monitoring the agents and their limited rationality.
With regard to investment determinants in Brazil, 
Bacha and Bonelli (2005) analyze the evolution of the 
Brazilian relative investment price from 1950 to 2000. 
They notice a sharp growth in this price, especially from 
1950 to 1990 when it more than doubled. The authors 
state that this acceleration was caused, among other 
things, by the rise in the price of machinery and equip-
ment. The authors list a series of possible explanations for 
this phenomenon: an increase in the oligopolistic power 
of industries, inefficiency in the production process of 
capital goods, an increased demand for durable goods, the 
defensive pricing behavior of the oligopolies and, finally, 
errors in the measurement of price indices.    
Mattos, Cassuce and Campos (2007) investigate the 
determinants of Brazilian direct foreign investment from 
1980 to 2004. Using an error correction model methodol-
ogy, they find evidence that the entrance of direct foreign 
investment in to Brazil was very sensitive to variables such 
as country risk, the level of openness and the inflation rate. 
The transaction costs theory has recently appeared 
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growth. According to Rodrik (2008), developing countries 
have high transaction costs in the steps of the tradable 
goods production process and that makes it difficult for 
such countries to export. Hence, according to the author, 
the devaluation of the exchange rate would reduce the 
negative effects of transaction costs on the export of such 
goods, thus generating more income for these economies.  
This theory has recently been applied to many other 
areas, both inside and outside the economy, according to 
Macher and Richman (2008). Among the areas in which 
this theory has been applied are accounting, finance, 
marketing and industrial organization. In relation to ac-
counting, Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) argue that, by 
detecting transaction costs and establishing organizational 
innovations, it is possible to reduce production costs. In 
the finance area, Benmelech and others (2005) found a 
negative relation between the ability to enforce contracts 
and interest rates on loans. As for marketing strategies, 
Murray (2001) states that, with globalization, the creation 
of new global strategic alliances reduces the impact 
of transaction costs on investments in specific assets. 
Finally, the literature regarding industrial organization has 
been engaged in obtaining the best kinds of governance 
practices so that transaction costs are reduced, according 
to Richman (2006).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study uses a sample of 35 countries selected accord-
ing to their participation in the world economy, with 
annual data from 2004 to 2007. The countries are listed 
in Exhibit 1. 
The dependent variable will be the Investment Rate 
and Foreign Direct Investment (capital influx) obtained 
from the Penn World Table and the OECD, respectively. 
It is assumed that the investment rate and foreign direct 
investment are functions of macroeconomic variables 
(such as the interest rate, market size, inflation etc) as 
well as of transaction costs variables. The following items 
shall be used as transaction cost measures:
a) Economic freedom indices (with scores ranging from 
0 to 100, where 100 means the maximum free market, 
which are provided by the Heritage Foundation.
b) Business data (variables such as investment cost, level 
of commercial openness etc), which are provided by 
Penn World Table.
c) Instruments of business regulation (property rights, 
time required to open and close a business etc), which 
are provided by Doing Business.
The description of all the variables used in this study is 
given in Exhibit 2.
The empirical strategy used in section 4 will therefore 
be a panel data model, with control for the fixed effect 
of each country (ai), estimated by Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) for equations (1) and (2):
  (1)    
  (2)    
In which: 
   is the investment rate of country i in period t.  
   is the direct foreign investment inflow in millions of 
Dollars for country i in period t.
  represents the vectors with dimensions k or n of tran-
saction cost variables of country i in period t. 
 represents the vectors with dimensions j or m of ma-
croeconomic variables of country i in period t.
The advantage of using an estimation model with fixed ef-
fect control is that there may be variables which affect the 
dependent variables and are correlated to the explanatory 
Australia Denmark Ireland Netherlands South Africa
Austria Finland Island New Zealand Spain
Belgium France Italy Norway Sweden
Brazil Germany Japan Poland Switzerland
Canada Greece Korea Portugal Turkey
China Hungary Luxembourg Russia United Kingdom
Czech Republic India Mexico Slovakia United States
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Exhibit 2 – Description of the variables used in this work
VARiABLE DESCRiPtion
Population  Thousands of inhabitants
Exchange Rate In relation to the Dollar
Per Capita Product Per capita product in Dollar
Government Participation Per capita tax burden / Per capita gross domestic product
Investment Rate Investment /GDP
Investment Price In relation to GDP and in Puchasing Power Parity
Openness Level (Exports+Imports)/GDP
GDP over GNP GDP/GNP in Purchasing Power Parity
GDP Growth Per Capita Rate per year
Foreign Direct Investment (US$ millions)  Influx in millions of Dollars
Overall Score  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Freedom of Business  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Freedom of Commerce  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Fiscal Freedom  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Freedom of Government  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Monetary Freedom  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Investmente Freedom  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Financial Freedom  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Property Right  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Freedom of Corruption  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Freedom of Work  0-100, 100 being the highest mark
Days to Open a Business  In days
Costs to Open a Business  % of per capita income
Difficulty to Hire  Index from 0 to 100, 100 is the more rigid
Working Hours Rigidity  Index from 0 to 100, 100 is the more rigid
Time to Register a Property  In days
Costs of Registering a Property  % of property’s value
Time to Enforce Contracts  In days
Costs of Enforcing Contracts  % of complaints
Time to Close a Business  In years
Costs of Closing a Business  % of state
Short Term Interest Rat  % per year
Long Term Interest Rate  % per year
Country Risk  1-4, 4 being the most risky
Source: Penn World Table, Doing Business, Heritage Foundation and OECD.180  •  ©RAE  •  São Paulo  •  v. 51  •  n. 2  •  mar./abr. 2011  •  175-187 ISSN 0034-7590
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ones but which are not included in this model. Thus, by 
assuming that such variables are fixed for each country, 
there is no risk of biased estimations. In this way, fixed 
effect estimation is always consistent. However, fixed ef-
fect estimation is not always the most efficient choice. The 
tests that corroborate the choice of fixed effect estimation 
will be discussed later.
The definition of the set of variables to be used was 
chosen ad hoc. The transaction cost variables are the 
variables of interest. The economic freedom indices are 
taken from the same source as those used by Sara and 
Newhouse (1995). The innovation of this study in relation 
to Sara and Newhouse (1995) is, firstly, its examination 
of economic variables for the different countries, since 
the sample includes both developed and developing 
countries. The second innovative aspect of this study is 
the use of business environment variables provided by 
Doing Business.
The expected signs of variables used are described 
in Exhbit 3. According to the literature that has al-
ready been mentioned it is expected that transaction cost 
variables are negatively associated with the investment rate 
and direct foreign investment. Hence, countries with greater 
economic freedom and better business environments tend 
to have higher investment rates and higher inward flows 
of direct foreign investment. However, as is also shown in 
the literature review, there are questions relating to limited 
rationality that may hinder the monitoring of transaction 
costs. The macroeconomic variables were used as controls. 
However, it is expected that countries with better macro-
economic scenarios will present higher investment rates 
and higher levels of foreign direct investment. 
DIFFERENT INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENTS
In order to compare the different business environments 
of the countries in the sample, the determinant investment 
variables were divided into two groups: macroeconomic 
variables and transaction cost variables. Another im-
portant distinction relates to the groups of countries. 
The analysis focused on verifying the above-mentioned 
variables for the entire sample and for two subdivisions: 
1. BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India and China
2. PIIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the macroeco-
nomic variables for the entire sample and separately for 
the BRICs and the PIIGS. 
It is worth noting that the BRICs have higher mean 
direct foreign investment and higher mean per capita 
economic growth. This is because they are developing 
countries and the investment flows are bound to go to 
countries with high interest rates. As can be observed 
in Table 1, the interest rates in developing countries 
are higher.  It should also be noted that the BRICs have 
higher investment rates. Whereas domestic investment 
in relation to domestic product is on average 30% for 
all the countries in the sample, the investment rate in 
the BRICs is approximately 20%. Moreover, on average 
the investment price in the BRICs is lower than in other 
countries. This may be due to the fact that the labor force 
price in developing countries is lower than in developed 
countries. 
The other variables displayed in table 1 show that the 
BRICs also present macroeconomic indicators peculiar to 
developing countries. For instance, per capita income is 
much lower in the BRICs than in the rest of sample while 
their inflation rate is much higher than in the developed 
countries. Similar results are observed in relation to the 
level of openness, which shows that trading levels are 
still lower in the BRICs than in the developed countries. 
Country risk is higher than the mean of the sample both 
for the BRICs and for the PIIGs, which indicates that, in 
general, these countries have worse institutions. It should 
also be noted that the country risk is the same for country 
groups. In the case of the PIIGS, similar results are found 
between this group and the average of the countries in 
the sample. 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the transac-
tion cost variables of the countries in the sample. 
According to Table 5, it can be verified that most 
indicators of business rigidity and economic freedom 
in the BRICs are below the indicators of developed 
countries. This fact is evidence of the greater difficulty 
of doing business in these countries. In the Heritage 
Foundation economic freedom indices, for instance, it 
can be observed that the scores of the BRICs are less 
than the sample mean in all measured criteria. The 
overall score, which favors the general mean of the 
economic freedom index, shows that the BRICs have 
a score 25% lower than the average of the other coun-
tries in the sample. This fact, in addition to creating 
difficulties for the investment flow, does not produce 
an environment that is conducive to entrepreneurship 
in the country. 
Tables 1 and 2 also show that state participation in the 
BRIC economies is greater than in the other countries 
of the sample. It is noticed in the variable Government Marcos Vinício Wink Junior • Hsia Hua sHeng • WilliaM eid Junior
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Participation, which is shown in Table 1, and Freedom 
of Government, which is shown in Table 2, there is a 
great difference between the BRIC average and the rest 
of the sample. 
REGRESSION RESULTS
The estimation strategy is based on a full regression 
model with several explanatory variables, and on a simple 
Exhbit 3 – Expected signs of variables
DEPEnDEnt VARiABLE
inDEPEnDEnt VARiABLE  inVEStMEnt 
RAtE 
FoREiGn 
DiRECt 
inVEStMEnt 
thEoREtiCAL BACkGRounD
Government Participation  (-)  (-)  Dunning (1994) and Sara and Newhouse (1995)
Population 
Control
Variable 
(+)
There may be a positive relationship, since countries with large popula-
tions tend to have cheap labor and a large consumer market, encoura-
ging foreign investment.
Per Capita Product  (+)  (+)
It is expected that countries with better macroeconomic scenarios present 
higher investment rates and higher foreign direct investment
Openess Level  (+)  (+)
It is expected that countries with better macroeconomic scenarios present 
higher investment rates and higher foreign direct investment
Country Risk  (-)  (-)
It is expected that countries with better macroeconomic scenarios present 
higher investment rates and higher foreign direct investment
Investment Rate  (+)  (+)
It is expected that countries with better macroeconomic scenarios present 
higher investment rates and higher foreign direct investment
Inflation Rate (IPC)  (-)  (-)
It is expected that countries with better macroeconomic scenarios present 
higher investment rates and higher foreign direct investment
Long Term Interest Rate  (-)  (-)
It is expected that countries with better macroeconomic scenarios present 
higher investment rates and higher foreign direct investment
Per Capita Growth  (+)  (+)
It is expected that countries with better macroeconomic scenarios present 
higher investment rates and higher foreign direct investment
Investment Price  (-)  (-)  Bacha and Bonelli (2005)
Overallscore Freedom  (+)  (+)  Sara and Newhouse (1995)
Days to open a business  (-)  (-) 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and Faroque and 
Ton-That (1995)
Difficulty to hire  (-)  (-) 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and Faroque and 
Ton-That (1995)
Costs to register a property  (-)  (-) 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and Faroque and 
Ton-That (1995)
Time to enforce contracts  (-)  (-)  Maher (1997)
Time to close a business  (-)  (-) 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and Faroque and 
Ton-That (1995)
Costs of opening a business  (-)  (-) 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and Faroque and 
Ton-That (1995)
Hours Rigidity  (-)  (-) 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Schaller (1993), and Faroque and 
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regression model, whose explanatory variables are 
selected according to Schwarz criteria. Thus, 4 models 
will be estimated in all, of which two relate to equation 
(1), models (I) and (II) and two relate to equation (2), 
models (III and IV). For the purpose of analysis, the 
models chosen will be the simple models (II) and (IV), 
as these were selected based on an information criterion. 
Table 3 shows the tests that were performed to justify 
the choice of the estimated models.
The Breusch-Pagan test, in table 3, shows that none 
of the models can be estimated by simple OLS as the 
test rejected the null hypothesis of zero error variance 
for the component that does not change over time.   
The Hausman test suggests that models (II), (III) and 
(IV) should be estimated with a fixed effect control, 
since the random effect does not produce consistent 
results. The VIF statistic (variance inflation factor) 
shows that the estimation of the full models (I) and 
(II) increased, on average, the variance of each of 
the estimators of the explanatory variables compared 
to the same statistic obtained for the simple models 
(II) and (IV), indicating high collinearity between 
the independent variables. The models selected for 
analysis – (II) and (IV) - must therefore be estimated 
using fixed effect OLS.
Table 4 shows the coefficients and their respective stan-
dard deviations from the equation (1) estimation by OLS 
with fixed effect control. As mentioned above, Model (I) 
comprises a wide range of variables, whether significant 
or not. Model (II) was the most robust one based on the 
data. This model uses variables that were robust regard-
less of the inclusion or exclusion of other variables, and 
it also uses variables that were not significant but that 
somehow contributed to better adjustment of the model, 
which was analyzed based on the Schwarz information 
criterion value.  
According to the information in Table 4, it can be 
observed that macroeconomic variables and transaction 
costs variables affect an economy’s investment rate. By 
analyzing the coefficients that are results of model (II), 
it is possible to verify a significant negative relation 
between state participation in the economy and the in-
vestment rate. Therefore, a 1% rise in State participation 
in the economy leads to an average fall in the economy’s 
investment rate of 0.78%, ceteris paribus. There is 
also a positive relation between per capita output and 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic variables
VARiABLE EntiRE SAMPLE BRiCS onLy PiiGS onLy
MEAn StAnDARD 
DEViAtion
MEAn StAnDARD 
DEViAtion
MEAn StAnDARD 
DEViAtion
FDI (US$ millions)  32127.55  49488.9  37517.25  35802.76  13718.27  21818.84
Investment Rate  29.14  6.68  22.34  7.18  34.04  2.36
Population  113269.2  278222.2  686387.7  542842.6  24755.79  21444.91
GDP per capita  27193.48  14254.41  8045.05  3492.35  29061.29  6853.35
Growth per capita  3.69  2.27  6.86  2.49  2.71  1.66
Openness Level  86.51  52.32  48.94  15.77  77.44  38.16
Investment Price  75.40  18.39  47.65  16.11  76.82  14.18
Government Participation 14.86 4.40 21.44 3.76 12.31 1.04
GDP / GNP 98.18 4.47 98.50 1.54 95.68 5.43
Inflation Rate (IPC) 3.00  2.21  5.91  3.15  2.69  0.51
Country Risk (The Economist) 1.87 0.72 3 0 2 0
Government Bond Interests 4.62 1.58 7.3 0.78 3.98 0.37
Long Term Interests 4.72 1.70 7.52 0.79 3.98 0.37
Short Term Interests 3.85 2.91 4.54 2.08 2.91 0.89
Observations 140 16 20
Source: Secondary data of the IMF.Marcos Vinício Wink Junior • Hsia Hua sHeng • WilliaM eid Junior
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of variables regarding transaction costs
EntiRE SAMPLE EntiRE SAMPLE BRiCS onLy PiiGS onLy
VARiABLE MEAn StAnDARD 
DEViAtion
MEAn StAnDARD 
DEViAtion
MEAn StAnDARD 
DEViAtion
Costs of closing a business 10.05  6.14  12.43  5.75  12.4  4.66
Years to close a business 2.422  2.353  6.175  3.52  1.38  0.64
Costs of enforcing a contract 19.53 8.12 20.15 11.76 20.52 6.76
Days to enforce a contract 424.772 191.8 328.60 233.15 485.469 273.66
Costs of registering a property 48.972 3.732 4.35 4.092 7.41 4.32
Days to register a property 42.72 48.2 45.375 12.34 38.6 23.27
Working hours rigidity (index) 31.28 19.74 38.25 14.93 38.8 22.34
Difficulty to hire (index) 28.07 22.68 29.81 26.34 43.2 22.64
Costs of opening a business 11.07 12.09 24.03 22.86 16.285 7.63
Days to open a business 31.02 30.26 76.18 48.55 41.05 32.28
Freedom of government 65.42 23.50 31.75 5.15 60.25 12.08
Freedom of property rights 72.42 19.59 39.37 11.23 68 14.36
Financial freedom  66.35  19.82  35  8.16  64.5  16.69
Investment freedom 66.21 16.42 40.62 9.97 70 12.97
Monetary freedom  82.07  6.68  74.61 6.84 82.13 2.63
Fiscal freedom  63.03 13.22 78.43 9.40 60.055 7.49
Freedom of commerce 77.64 10.35 56.06 15.08 81.75 2.33
Freedom of business 76.46 13.04 55.61 7.17 76.135 7.61
Overall score freedom 62.89 8.53 55.54 3.66 67.21 7.94
Observations 140 16 20
Source: Secondary data of the Heritage Foundation.
Table 3 – Diagnostic tests
tEStS MoDEL i MoDEL ii MoDEL iii MoDEL iV
Breusch-Pagan (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman (P-value) 0.118 0.002 0.085 0.000
Mean VIF Statistics 2.980 2.530 3.540 1.480
investment rate, which indicates that richer countries 
invest more, possibly because they have a high savings 
account rate. Thus, an increase in per capita income of 
US$ 1.00 generates an average rise in the investment 
rate of 0.0002%, ceteris paribus. Another important 
macroeconomic result is the negative relationship 
between the level of openness and the investment rate. 
Based on the cost-monitoring theory, one interpreta-
tion of such results is the fact that domestic investors 
have more incentive to invest, for example, in a shoe 
factory, if they know that their country does not trade 
with the rest of the world. Thus, their market power 
is greater and they do not have foreign shoe sellers as 
competitors. 184  •  ©RAE  •  São Paulo  •  v. 51  •  n. 2  •  mar./abr. 2011  •  175-187 ISSN 0034-7590
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In relation to the variables that represent transaction 
costs, a negative relationship is observed between these 
costs and the economy’s investment rate. The general 
economic freedom index (overall score) presents a posi-
tive relationship with the investment rate. Therefore, 
the greater a country’s economic freedom, the higher 
the average investment rate of its economy. Difficulty 
in hiring and the time required to enforce contracts are 
also negatively related to the average investment rate of 
the economy. 
Variables such as country risk, the long term interest 
rate, inflation rate and the number of days it takes to 
open a business were not statistically significant. The 
intercept represents the average fixed effect value.  This 
happens because of the estimation method used by the 
Stata 9.0 econometrics package, which estimates the 
Table 4 – Equation (i) estimation
DEPEnDEnt VARiABLE 
inVEStMEnt RAtE
MoDEL i 
CoEF. 
(DP)
MoDEL ii
CoEF
(DP)
Government Participation
-0.7854**
(0.32)
-0.8427**
(0.34)
Investment Price
0.0154
(0.04)
0.0287
(0.04)
Population
-0.00013
(0.0002)
Per Capita Product
0.000189**
(0.000007)
0.000208***
(0.00007)
Openness Level
-0.0827**
(0.03)
-0.0886**
(0.03)
Overall score Freedom
0.2404**
(0.1) 
0.2715**
(0.10)
Days to open a business
-0.01346
(0.01) 
-0.00927
(0.01)
Difficulty to hire
-0.04652*
(0.02) 
-0.0535*
(0.02)
Costs to register a property
-0.1621
(0.12)
Time to enforce contracts
-0.0232*
(0.01) 
-0.0266*
(0.01)
Time to close a business
11.753
(1.36)
Inflation Rate (IPC)
0.283055**
(0.14) 
0.375756**
(0.14)
Country Risk
-0.74245
(1.02) 
-0.07255
(0.29)
Long Term Interest Rate
-0.25847
(0.27) 
-0.6626
(1.11)
Intercept
41.8433**
(17.36)
35.94564**
(14.64)
Note: *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% and 1% of significance, respectively.Marcos Vinício Wink Junior • Hsia Hua sHeng • WilliaM eid Junior
ISSN 0034-7590 ©RAE  •  São Paulo  •  v. 51  •  n. 2  •  mar./abr. 2011  •  175-187  •  185
Table 5 – Equation (2) estimation
DEPEnDEnt VARiABLE 
FoREiGn DiRECt inVEStMEnt
MoDEL iii
CoEF. 
(DP)
MoDEL iV
CoEF
(DP)
Population
13.5***
(3.4) 
1.0**
(0.5)
Per Capita Product
4.9*** 
(1.3) 
5.1***
(0.7)
Exchange Rate
185.3
(141.9)
Government Participation
9075.0
(6672.2)
Investment Rate
743.3
(2013.0)
Investment Price
935.6
(977.6)
Openness Level
-9.4
(693.8)
Per Capita Growth
477.3
(1877.7)
Overall score Freedom
512.3
(2012.8)
Days to open a business
81.9
(226.3)
Costs of opening a business
-1147.2
(1082.5)
Difficulty to hire
-343.8
(516.9)
Hours Rigidity
211.1
(634.8)
Inflation Rate (IPC)
-896.1
(3719.7)
Country Risk
-2497.2
(20483.0)
Long Term Interest Rate
-2786.8
(6137.7)
Intercept
-912261.0***
(296577.3) 
-290681.0***
(66278.1)
Investment Freedom
1052.0***
(425.4)
Note: *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% and 1% of significance, respectively.
intercept by restricting the average of the fixed effects 
to zero (a = 0).
Table 5 presents the results of equation (2) estima-
tion. As in equation (1), a more general model is present-186  •  ©RAE  •  São Paulo  •  v. 51  •  n. 2  •  mar./abr. 2011  •  175-187 ISSN 0034-7590
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ed (model III) and then non-significant variables and   
variables that were not robust during the estima-
tions are removed and a simpler model (model IV) is 
used and is selected based on a Schwarz information 
criterion.   
The results displayed in Table 5 indicate that transac-
tion costs have no significant impact on foreign direct 
investment, which contrasts with the findings of Sara 
and Newhouse (1995).  Nevertheless, it can be verified 
that in both models III and IV the estimated coefficients 
for the population and per capita income are significant 
and positively related to foreign direct investment. Thus 
it can be observed that foreign investors make decisions 
to invest in other countries mainly by checking the size of 
the country’s domestic market, i.e. the per capita income 
level and the size of the population. As in the case of the 
estimations of models (I) and (II), here the intercept also 
represents the average of the fixed effects.
Only investment freedom seems to be related to 
foreign direct investment. To some extent this result is 
in accordance with Coase (1991), who shows that the 
issue of property rights – an essential variable for foreign 
investors – is only important in the case of significant 
transaction costs. Therefore, the result that transaction 
costs are not significant shows that this variable is not 
material enough to affect the view of the foreign inves-
tor. So there is evidence that the transaction costs of the 
countries in the sample are not, on average, material 
enough to negatively impact the economy.
These results also corroborate those found by 
Macaulay (1985) and Williamson (1985), which have 
already been mentioned. According to these authors, 
investments in non-specific sectors of the economy are 
not governed by contracts and, therefore, do not generate 
transaction costs. Williamson (1985) attributes these 
results to the fact that the rationality of individuals is 
limited and the fact that the cost of monitoring and 
obtaining information is often very high. Therefore, 
they suggest that an investor does not have perfect 
information about other countries and transaction 
costs are therefore not determinants of direct foreign 
investment. On the other hand, the investment rate 
is related to domestic investment in a country, as can 
be verified in models I and II. As they are in their own 
country, investors have more access to information, so 
transaction costs are bound to have an impact on the 
country’s investment rate. Other works also found no 
evidence that transaction costs affect foreign investors, 
for instance Putterman (1996) and Richardson (1972). 
CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of this study was to verify whether 
transaction costs have any impact on investment and for-
eign direct investment decision-making and to determine 
what the signs of this impact are. By using regressions with 
panel data for a sample of 35 countries over a 4-year period 
(2004-2007), the results suggest that transaction costs, as 
well as macroeconomic variables, affect the investment 
rate. Transaction costs, basically evaluated by economic 
rigidity indices, were significant and negatively related to 
the investment rate of the countries. On the other hand, 
when the dependent variable was foreign direct invest-
ment, transaction costs did not seem to have any impact 
on the foreign investors’ decision-making. According to 
the estimated models, foreign investors seem to make 
decisions based exclusively on the size of the domestic 
market.  
Such results concur with those of Williamson (1985), 
Macaulay (1985) and Coase (1991). According to these 
authors, transaction costs affect investment decisions 
negatively only if: transaction costs are high enough; 
there are no costs attached to obtaining information; 
or if the investments are not in a specific sector of the 
economy. Therefore, the results suggest that investors 
have almost perfect information in their own country 
and, consequently, the are lower costs of obtaining infor-
mation in such a country than in obtaining information 
regarding market rigidity and property rights in other 
countries.
Another conclusion of this study is that, when analyz-
ing the available data, the BRICs on average have worse 
business environments than the other countries in the 
sample. This has interesting implications for cooperation 
between companies and entrepreneurs in this region, as 
entrepreneurs from the BRICs are able to confront trans-
action costs. In order to evaluate the relative position of 
the BRICs in relation to business environments, African 
countries could also be included in this sample for further 
research. This would make it possible to carry out a more 
precise analysis of the role of the BRICs in several business 
environments.  
Another suggestion is to carry out studies that might 
capture the effects of transaction costs for different sectors 
in developing countries. This would make it possible to 
verify not only how transaction costs affect the sectors 
in a developing economy, but also to test the Williamson 
(1985) hypothesis of transaction costs being negatively 
related to specific investments. Marcos Vinício Wink Junior • Hsia Hua sHeng • WilliaM eid Junior
ISSN 0034-7590 ©RAE  •  São Paulo  •  v. 51  •  n. 2  •  mar./abr. 2011  •  175-187  •  187
REFERENCES 
ARROW, K. J. The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to 
the choice of market versus non-market allocation. In The analysis and 
evaluation of public expenditures: The PBB-System, U.S. Joint Economic 
Committee, 91st Session, v. 1, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C, 1969.
BACHA, E. L; BONELLI, R. Uma interpretação das causas da desaceleração 
econômica do Brasil (An interpretation of the causes of economic deceleration 
in Brazil). Revista de Economia Política, v. 25, n.3, p. 163-189, 2005.
BENJAMIN, C; PHIMISTER, E. Transaction costs, farm finance and 
investment. European Review of Agricultural Economics, v. 24, n. 3-4, p. 
453-466, 1997.
BENMELECH, E; GARMAISE, M; MOSKOWITZ, T. Do liquidation values 
affect financial constraints? Evidence from commercial loan contracts 
and zoning regulation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 120, p. 1121-
1154, 2005.
COASE, R. H. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 
v. 3, n. 3, p. 1-44, 1960.
COASE, R. H. The institutional structure of production. Nobel Prize Lecture, 
Stockholm, 1991.
COOPER, R; SLAGMULDER, R. Inter-organizational cost management 
and relational context. Accounting Organizations and Society, v. 29, n.1, 
p. 1-26, 2004.
DUNNING, J. Re-evaluating the benefits of foreign direct investment. 
Transnational Corporations, v. 3, n. 1, 1994.
FAROQUE, A; TON-THAT, T. Financing constraints and firm heterogeneity 
in investment behaviour: An application of non-nested tests. Applied 
Economics, v. 27, n.3, p. 317-326, 1995.
FAZZARI, S. M; HUBBARD, R. G; PETERSEN, B. C. Financing constraints 
and corporate investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, v. 1988, 
n. 1, p. 141–95, 1988.
FURUBOTN, E; RICHTER, R. Institutions and economic theory: The 
contribution of the new institutional economics. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1997.
MACAULAY, S. Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study. 
American Sociological Review, v.28, n.1, 28, p. 55-67, 1963.
MACAULAY, S. An empirical view of contract. Wisconsin Law Review, v. 
3, p. 465-482, 1985.
MACHER, J; RICHMAN, B. Transaction cost economics: An assessment 
of empirical research in the social sciences. Business and Politics, v. 10, 
n. 1, 2008.
MAHER, M. Transaction cost economics and contractual relations. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, v. 21, n.2, p. 147-170, 1997.
MANKIW, N. G. Small menu costs and large business cycles: A 
Macroeconomic model of monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
v. 100, n. 2, p. 529-537, 1985.
MATTOS, L; CASSUCE, F; CAMPO, A. Determinantes dos investimentos 
direto estrangeiros no Brasil, 1980-2004 (Determinants of foreign direct 
investment in Brazil, 1980-2004). Revista de Economia Contemporânea, v. 
11, n. 1, p. 39-60, 2007. 
MURRAY, J. Y. Strategic alliance-based global sourcing strategy for 
competitive advantage. Journal of International Marketing, v. 9, n. 4, p. 
30-58, 2001.
NORTH, D. C. Government and the cost of exchange. Journal of Economic 
History, v. 44, p. 255-64, 1984.
NORTH, D. C. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
PUTTERMAN, L. The economic nature of the firm. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996.
RICHARDSON, G. B. The organization of industry. The Economic Journal, 
v. 82, n. 327, p. 883-896, 1972.
RICHMAN, B. D. How communities create economic advantage: Jewish 
diamond merchants in New York. Law and Social Inquiry, v. 31, n. 2, p. 
383-420, 2006.
RODRIK, D. The real exchange rate and economic growth. Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, v. 2, p. 365–412, 2008.
SARA, T. S; NEWHOUSE, B. Transaction costs and foreign direct 
investment in developing countries, International Advances in Economic 
Research, v. 1, n. 4, p. 317-325, 1995.
SCHALLER, H. Asymmetric information, liquidity constraints and 
Canadian investment. Canadian Journal of Economics, v. 26, n. 3, p. 552-
574, 1993.
WALLIS, J. J; NORTH, D. C. Measuring the transaction sector in the American 
economy, 1870-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
WHITED, T. M. Debt, liquidity constraints, and corporate investment: 
evidence from panel data. Journal of Finance, v. 48, n. 4, p. 1425-1460, 
1992.
WILLIAMSON, O. E. Transaction cost economics: The governance of 
contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, v. 22, p. 233-61, 1979.
WILLIAMSON, O. E. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: 
Free Press, 1985.